本帖最后由 家有春夏 于 2012-4-11 15:32 编辑
案：推荐列奥·施特劳斯关于liberal education（国内翻譯為自由教育，博雅教育，或者通識教育）的论述。这里先转一篇。下面的译文大部分还算通顺，但是很多细节似乎翻译得有点别扭。现在出版的《古今自由教育》译本的翻译可能好一些。
找到了原文，贴在第二楼，可以直接读原文，比较好。
列奥·施特劳斯：什么是自由教育？（Liberal ）
一行译
自由教育是在文化之中或朝向文化的教育。它的成品是一个文化的人（a cultured human being）。"文化"（cultura）首先意味着农作：对土壤及其作物的培育，对土壤的照料，以及按其本性对土壤品质的提升。"文化"衍生性地、且在今天主要地意味着对心灵的培育，按心灵的本性对其内在能力的照料和提升。就像土壤需要其培育者那样，心灵需要老师。但老师的产生可没有农夫那么容易。老师自己也是且必须是学生。但这种返回不能无限进行下去：最终必须要有一些不再作为学生的老师。这些不再是学生的老师是那些伟大的心灵，或者，为了避免在一件如此重要的事情上的含混表述，就是那些最伟大的心灵。这些人实乃凤毛麟角。我们在任何课堂都不可能遇到他们。我们也不可能在任何其他地方遇到。一个时代有一位这样的人活着就已经是一种幸运了。然而学生们为其实践目的，无论其熟练程度如何，都可以而接近这些老师，接近这些最伟大的心灵，只要他们阅读那些伟大的书。因而自由教育由以适当的态度研读那些最伟大心灵留下的杰作构成--在这种研读中，较有经验的学生帮助那些经验较少者，包括那些初学者。
这并非一项易事，如果我们考虑一下我刚才提到的教育模式的话。那一模式需要一个长长的注释。许多生命都已经、并仍将消逝在对这些注释的写作中。例如，说伟大的书应该被"以适当的态度"研读是什么意思？此刻我只提一个对你们任何人都很显然的困难：最伟大的心灵在最重要的主题上并不都告诉我们相同的事情；他们的共存状况被彼此的分歧、甚至是极大量的分歧所占据。无论如何，它都显然导致了自由教育不能是单纯的灌输这一结果。我还要提另一个困难。"自由教育是在文化之中的教育。"在什么文化中？我们回答说：是西方传统意义上的文化。然而西方文化只是诸种文化之一。把我们自己限定在西方文化中，这种自由教育难道不会被指责为一种狭隘主义，而狭隘主义不是与自由教育的自由主义理念，与它的兼容并包，与它的心灵开放性不相容吗？我们的教育方式似乎不能适合这样的一代人，他们知道，事实上存在的不只是某一种人（西方人）的文化，存在的是各种文化。显然，文化如果能容许被用作复数，它就完全不同于作为特指（singulare tantum）的文化，后者只能用作单数。像人们所说的，文化现在不再是绝对的，而已经成为相对的。认为文化能被用于复数意义也会有问题。这种含混性的结果是，人们已经或详或略地提出文化是任何人类群体中存在的任何行为模式。因此我们就不能不说存在着所谓的"郊区文化"或"青少年文化"，无论这些人的行为是守法或违法。换句话说，任何精神病院之外的人都可以称做文化的人（a cultured human being）。在探究的边缘就出现了像疯人院中的病人是否也有文化这样的问题。如果我们将"文化"一词在今天的用法与它的原初意义作一个对照，它就好像某人可以说，对花园的培育可以由园子里的垃圾，由那些空的锡杯和威士忌酒瓶，由那些写满字的被随手扔在园中的废纸构成。既然得出的是这样一种观点，我们就认识到自己不知何故已经迷路了。因而让我们用这样的问题重新开始：此时此地，自由教育能够意味着什么？
自由教育是某种文学的2[２]（literate）教育：某种在书写（letter）之中或通过书写进行的教育。没有必要举例说明这种教养；每一位选民都知道现代民主制与之相辅相成[３]。为了理解这种需要，我们必须反思现代民主制度。什么是现代民主？有人曾说过，民主制是一种与德性相辅相成的政体：它是一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人都禀有德性的政体，并且，既然德性要求智慧，它也是一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人富于德性和智慧的政体，亦即一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人拥有高水平理性的社会，即一种理性社会（rational society）。民主，简而言之，意味着一种扩展为普遍贵族制的贵族制。现代民主制还没有产生之前，对如此理解的民主制是否可能的疑问就已经提出来了。正如民主理论家中两位最伟大者之一所说的，"如果有一个由诸神构成群体，它的确能民主地统治它自己。而一个如此完善的政府对人类却不适合。"这一坚定而微弱的声音现在已变得如此响亮。
这里有一种科学--政治科学，我是它成千的教授者之一--可以说它除了在民主的原初概念，或可称为民主的理念，与作为现实存在的民主之间进行对照之外没有其他的主题。按照一种极端的观点，亦即这一专业中的主流观点，民主的理念只是一个纯粹的幻想，唯一起作用的是民主（政府）的行为和其中之人的行为。现代民主，与普遍贵族制迥异，或许是一种大众统治（mass rule），但这并非事实，因为事实上大众并不能进行统治，而是统治于精英，即那些无论出于何种原因处在上层或有很好的机会升到上层的人；对民主的平稳运作来说最重要的德性，正如大众被认定的那样，据说是选民的冷漠，亦即公共精神的贫乏；并非真的地上的盐，而是现代民主制度的盐的[４]，是那些除了体育杂志和滑稽剧之外什么也不读的市民。民主因而的确不是大众统治， 而是大众文化。大众文化是一种被没有任何智识和道德努力，并因此极为廉价的最平庸的能力所占据的文化。但即使是大众文化也需要被称为新观念的事物的不断支持，而它们是那些被命名为创造性心灵的人的产品：因为甚至正在歌唱的广告节目也会失去其吸引力，如果它一遍遍重复而不更新的话。但是民主，即使它只被当成保护软弱的大众文化的硬壳，从长远来看也需要一些完全不同的品质：一种献身，一种专注，一种辽远，一种深邃。因此我们很容易地领会了此时此地自由教育意味着什么。自由教育是大众文化的解毒剂，它针对的是大众文化的腐蚀性影响，及其固有的只生?quot;没有精神的专家和没有心肝的纵欲者"[５]的倾向。自由教育是我们促使大众民主提升为原初意义上的民主所凭借的梯子。自由教育是在民主的大众社会中建立一种贵族制的必要努力。自由教育呼唤着大众民主中那些有耳能听[６]的成员，向他们呼唤人的卓越。
有人可能会说自由教育的方式仅仅是政治性的，因为它教条地假定了民主制就是好的。难道我们就不能从现代民主返回到过去吗？我们就不能回归自然，回归到原始部落的生活吗？我们不是为那些像美丽而庄严的森林中的坟墓一样成堆的印刷品而感到受挤压、恶心和退化吗？认为我们今天不可能回归自然因而说这种想法仅仅是浪漫主义，是不够的：难道将来的世代，在一场人为的大灾变之后，就不会被迫去过一种未开化的部落生活吗？难道我们对核战争的思考中就没有受这种预见的影响？显然，大众文化的可厌之处（包括对整个大自然的旅游观光）使这种回归自然的愿望变得可以理解。一个未开化的社会，在其最好状态中是由沿着原初立法者，亦即诸神、诸神之子或诸神的学生传下的古老习惯统治的社会；既然还不存在书写，后来的继承者就不能直接地与原初的立法者相联系；他们无法知道他们的父辈或祖父辈是否偏离了原初立法者的意图，是否用仅仅人为的附加或减少去毁损那些神圣的消息；因此一个未开化的社会不能前后一贯地按其"最好即最古老"的原则去行为。只有立法者留下的书写才使他们向后代直接说话成为可能。因此，企图回到未开化状态是自相矛盾的。我们被迫与书一起生活。但生命太短暂了，以致于我们只能（选择）和那些最伟大的书活在一起。在此，正如在其他方面一样，我们最好从这些最伟大的心灵中选取一位作为我们的榜样，他因其共通感[７]（common sense）而成为我们和这些最伟大的心灵之间的那个中介。苏格位底从不写书，但他读书。让我引证苏格拉底的一段论述吧，它几乎 谈到了与我们的主题相关的所有应被提及的事情，带着一种属于古代的高贵的单纯和宁静的卓越?;就像别人爱马、爱狗或爱鸟那样，我自己甚至更喜欢一位好的朋友……古老的贤人们通过把他们自身写进书中而留下的财富，我与我的朋友们一起展开它并穿行其上，而且如果我们看到了什么好东西，我们就拾起它并把它当做一次丰盛的收获，倘若我们因此能有益于他人的话。"传言这段话的人评论到："当我听到这些时，对我来说不仅苏格拉底受到祝佑，而且他还将那些倾听他谈话的人引向了完美的贵族气质。"但这个传言是有缺陷的，因为它没有告诉我们任何有关的事情，比如苏格拉底怎么对待古贤人们书中的那些他无法判断其优劣的章节。从另一则传言中，我们知道欧里庇得斯有一次将赫拉克利特的著作送给苏格拉底，并问他对这本著作的意见。苏格拉底说?我已经理解的部分是卓越而高贵的；我相信我所不能理解的部分同样是真实的；但为了理解这本著作，一个人肯定需要成为某种专门的潜海采珠者[８]。"
作为对完美的贵族气质和对人的优异的教育，自由教育由唤醒一个人自身的优异与卓越构成。而自由教育通过何种道路和方式唤醒我们身上的卓越？在此我们无法再更进一步地思考自由教育的含义了。我们听过柏拉图关于最高意义上的教育是哲学的提法。哲学是对智慧或对关于最重要的、最高的或最整全的事物的知识的追求；这种知识，按他的说法，是德性和幸福。但由于智慧不属于人，因此人的德性和幸福总是不完善的。尽管如此，哲学家，作为不完全智慧的人，还是被宣称为唯一真正的国王；他被宣称为拥有所有人类心灵能够达到的优异，因而是最高水平上的人。从这里我们必须得出我们不是哲学家的结论--因为我们无法获得这种最高形式的教育。我们一定不能被自己经常遇到一些自称哲学家的人所欺骗。因为他们采用的是一个对管理的方便来说有必要的广义的表述。他们通常不过是说他们是哲学系的。而认为哲学系的就是哲学家，和认为艺术系的就是艺术家一样荒谬。我们不能成为哲学家，但我们可以热爱哲学；我们可以努力进行哲学化的思考。这种哲学化的思考首先和主要的途径，就是倾听伟大哲学家之间，或者，更普遍和更审慎地说，最伟大心灵之间的交谈，并因而就是研读那些伟大的著作。我们应当倾听的最伟大的心灵并不只是西方的。妨碍我们倾听印度和中国的伟大心灵的仅仅是一种不幸的被迫：我们不懂他们的语言，而且我们不可能学习所有的语言。
再重复一遍：自由教育由倾听最伟大心灵之间的交谈构成。但这里我们面临着一个不可克服的困难：没有我们的帮助这种交谈就不会发生--我们必须实现这一交谈。最伟大的心灵在独白。 我们必须把他们的独白转换为一次对话，使他们"肩并肩"地进入这一"聚会"。甚至在写作对话录时，最伟大的心灵也仍在独白。如果我们看一看柏拉图的对话，就会发现没有一篇对话是发生在最高水平的心灵之间的：所有的柏拉图对话都是在一个较高的人和一个较低者之间进行。柏拉图显然认为一个人无法写出一篇在两个最高水平的人之间进行的对话。我们因而必须去做某些连最伟大的心灵都不能做到的事情。让我们直面这一困难--它是如此巨大以致于自由教育看来是荒谬的。既然最伟大的心灵们在最重要的事情上彼此之间相互矛盾，他们就迫使我们在他们的独白中做出裁决；我们不可能对他们所说的任何东西都表示相信。另一方面，我们不能不注意到，我们并不胜任做这种裁决者。
事情的真相被一种轻便的幻觉与我们隔开来。我们不知何故竟相信我们的观点比那些最伟大的心灵的观点更高、更优越——这既是因为我们的观点是我们时代的，而我们的时代，作为最伟大心灵所属时代的后来者，能被设想为优越于他们的时代；此外还因为我们相信他们中的每一位就其角度而言是正确的，但不是像他所声称的那样是完全的真理：我们知道不存在完全真实的实质性观点，而只存在一个完全真实的形式性观点；这个形式性观点是一种洞察，即任何整全性观点都是相对于特定视角而言的，因此所有的整全性观点都是独断并因而没有一个是完全真实的[９]。向我们隐藏我们真实处境的轻便幻觉都导因于此：我们是，或能是比过去时代的最智慧者更聪明的。我们因此导向这样的角色，不是成为专注和温驯的听者，而是成为指挥或驯狮员。但我们仍必须面对让我们敬畏的境况，它由一种努力带来，在其中我们不仅是专注和温驯的听者，而且是裁决者，并且我们仍然不能胜任这一角色。对我来说，这种境况的原因在于我们失去了所有我们能够信任的完全权威的传统，丧失了给我们以权威性引导的习俗（nomos），因为我们的老师以及老师的老师相信一个完全理性的社会的可能性。我们这里的每一位都被迫用他自己的力量寻找方向，然而这些方向都是有缺陷的。
除了其固有之物外，我们不能从这一活动中获得其他的安慰。哲学，我们已经知道，必须谨防希望给人以启迪--它只能是一种内在的启迪。我们只有经常理解一点有意义的东西才能发挥我们的理解力，而这一理解活动可以伴以对理解的领会，对理解的理解，对意向的意向（noesis noeseos），并且它是如此优越、如此纯粹、如此高贵的一种经验，以致于亚里士多德把它归之于神。这种经验完全独立于我们主要的理解是令人愉快还是令人不快，是美丽还是丑陋。它使我们认识到，要想理解，我们必须承认所有的邪恶在某种意义上都是必然的。它使我们能以上帝之城的好公民的精神接受发生于我们身上的邪恶，而且很可能是使我们伤心的邪恶。在意识到心灵的尊严的同时，我们也意识到人的尊严的基础以及世界的善。不管我们认为这个世界是被创造出来的还是自然的，它都是人类的家园，因为它是人类精神的发源地。
自由教育，作为与最伟大心灵们的不断交流，是一种在温顺（modesty）而不只是谦卑 (humility)的最高形式之中的试验。它同时是一次勇敢的冒险：它要求我们完全冲破智识者的浮华世界，它和他们的敌人的世界完全相同，冲破它的喧嚣、它的浮躁、它的无思考和它的廉价。它要求我们勇敢，并意味着决心将所接受的观点都仅仅当成意见，或者把普通意见当成至少与最陌生和最不流行的意见一样可能出错的极端意见。自由教育是从庸俗中的解放。希腊人对庸俗有一个绝妙的词；他们称之为apeirokalia，形容其缺乏对美好事物的经历。而自由教育将赠予我们这样的经历，在美好之中。
案：推荐列奥·施特劳斯关于liberal education（国内翻譯為自由教育，博雅教育，或者通識教育）的论述。这里先转一篇。下面的译文大部分还算通顺，但是很多细节似乎翻译得有点别扭。现在出版的《古今自由教育》译本的翻译可能好一些。
找到了原文，贴在第二楼，可以直接读原文，比较好。
列奥·施特劳斯：什么是自由教育？（Liberal ）
一行译
自由教育是在文化之中或朝向文化的教育。它的成品是一个文化的人（a cultured human being）。"文化"（cultura）首先意味着农作：对土壤及其作物的培育，对土壤的照料，以及按其本性对土壤品质的提升。"文化"衍生性地、且在今天主要地意味着对心灵的培育，按心灵的本性对其内在能力的照料和提升。就像土壤需要其培育者那样，心灵需要老师。但老师的产生可没有农夫那么容易。老师自己也是且必须是学生。但这种返回不能无限进行下去：最终必须要有一些不再作为学生的老师。这些不再是学生的老师是那些伟大的心灵，或者，为了避免在一件如此重要的事情上的含混表述，就是那些最伟大的心灵。这些人实乃凤毛麟角。我们在任何课堂都不可能遇到他们。我们也不可能在任何其他地方遇到。一个时代有一位这样的人活着就已经是一种幸运了。然而学生们为其实践目的，无论其熟练程度如何，都可以而接近这些老师，接近这些最伟大的心灵，只要他们阅读那些伟大的书。因而自由教育由以适当的态度研读那些最伟大心灵留下的杰作构成--在这种研读中，较有经验的学生帮助那些经验较少者，包括那些初学者。
这并非一项易事，如果我们考虑一下我刚才提到的教育模式的话。那一模式需要一个长长的注释。许多生命都已经、并仍将消逝在对这些注释的写作中。例如，说伟大的书应该被"以适当的态度"研读是什么意思？此刻我只提一个对你们任何人都很显然的困难：最伟大的心灵在最重要的主题上并不都告诉我们相同的事情；他们的共存状况被彼此的分歧、甚至是极大量的分歧所占据。无论如何，它都显然导致了自由教育不能是单纯的灌输这一结果。我还要提另一个困难。"自由教育是在文化之中的教育。"在什么文化中？我们回答说：是西方传统意义上的文化。然而西方文化只是诸种文化之一。把我们自己限定在西方文化中，这种自由教育难道不会被指责为一种狭隘主义，而狭隘主义不是与自由教育的自由主义理念，与它的兼容并包，与它的心灵开放性不相容吗？我们的教育方式似乎不能适合这样的一代人，他们知道，事实上存在的不只是某一种人（西方人）的文化，存在的是各种文化。显然，文化如果能容许被用作复数，它就完全不同于作为特指（singulare tantum）的文化，后者只能用作单数。像人们所说的，文化现在不再是绝对的，而已经成为相对的。认为文化能被用于复数意义也会有问题。这种含混性的结果是，人们已经或详或略地提出文化是任何人类群体中存在的任何行为模式。因此我们就不能不说存在着所谓的"郊区文化"或"青少年文化"，无论这些人的行为是守法或违法。换句话说，任何精神病院之外的人都可以称做文化的人（a cultured human being）。在探究的边缘就出现了像疯人院中的病人是否也有文化这样的问题。如果我们将"文化"一词在今天的用法与它的原初意义作一个对照，它就好像某人可以说，对花园的培育可以由园子里的垃圾，由那些空的锡杯和威士忌酒瓶，由那些写满字的被随手扔在园中的废纸构成。既然得出的是这样一种观点，我们就认识到自己不知何故已经迷路了。因而让我们用这样的问题重新开始：此时此地，自由教育能够意味着什么？
自由教育是某种文学的2[２]（literate）教育：某种在书写（letter）之中或通过书写进行的教育。没有必要举例说明这种教养；每一位选民都知道现代民主制与之相辅相成[３]。为了理解这种需要，我们必须反思现代民主制度。什么是现代民主？有人曾说过，民主制是一种与德性相辅相成的政体：它是一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人都禀有德性的政体，并且，既然德性要求智慧，它也是一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人富于德性和智慧的政体，亦即一种在其中所有或绝大多数成年人拥有高水平理性的社会，即一种理性社会（rational society）。民主，简而言之，意味着一种扩展为普遍贵族制的贵族制。现代民主制还没有产生之前，对如此理解的民主制是否可能的疑问就已经提出来了。正如民主理论家中两位最伟大者之一所说的，"如果有一个由诸神构成群体，它的确能民主地统治它自己。而一个如此完善的政府对人类却不适合。"这一坚定而微弱的声音现在已变得如此响亮。
这里有一种科学--政治科学，我是它成千的教授者之一--可以说它除了在民主的原初概念，或可称为民主的理念，与作为现实存在的民主之间进行对照之外没有其他的主题。按照一种极端的观点，亦即这一专业中的主流观点，民主的理念只是一个纯粹的幻想，唯一起作用的是民主（政府）的行为和其中之人的行为。现代民主，与普遍贵族制迥异，或许是一种大众统治（mass rule），但这并非事实，因为事实上大众并不能进行统治，而是统治于精英，即那些无论出于何种原因处在上层或有很好的机会升到上层的人；对民主的平稳运作来说最重要的德性，正如大众被认定的那样，据说是选民的冷漠，亦即公共精神的贫乏；并非真的地上的盐，而是现代民主制度的盐的[４]，是那些除了体育杂志和滑稽剧之外什么也不读的市民。民主因而的确不是大众统治， 而是大众文化。大众文化是一种被没有任何智识和道德努力，并因此极为廉价的最平庸的能力所占据的文化。但即使是大众文化也需要被称为新观念的事物的不断支持，而它们是那些被命名为创造性心灵的人的产品：因为甚至正在歌唱的广告节目也会失去其吸引力，如果它一遍遍重复而不更新的话。但是民主，即使它只被当成保护软弱的大众文化的硬壳，从长远来看也需要一些完全不同的品质：一种献身，一种专注，一种辽远，一种深邃。因此我们很容易地领会了此时此地自由教育意味着什么。自由教育是大众文化的解毒剂，它针对的是大众文化的腐蚀性影响，及其固有的只生?quot;没有精神的专家和没有心肝的纵欲者"[５]的倾向。自由教育是我们促使大众民主提升为原初意义上的民主所凭借的梯子。自由教育是在民主的大众社会中建立一种贵族制的必要努力。自由教育呼唤着大众民主中那些有耳能听[６]的成员，向他们呼唤人的卓越。
有人可能会说自由教育的方式仅仅是政治性的，因为它教条地假定了民主制就是好的。难道我们就不能从现代民主返回到过去吗？我们就不能回归自然，回归到原始部落的生活吗？我们不是为那些像美丽而庄严的森林中的坟墓一样成堆的印刷品而感到受挤压、恶心和退化吗？认为我们今天不可能回归自然因而说这种想法仅仅是浪漫主义，是不够的：难道将来的世代，在一场人为的大灾变之后，就不会被迫去过一种未开化的部落生活吗？难道我们对核战争的思考中就没有受这种预见的影响？显然，大众文化的可厌之处（包括对整个大自然的旅游观光）使这种回归自然的愿望变得可以理解。一个未开化的社会，在其最好状态中是由沿着原初立法者，亦即诸神、诸神之子或诸神的学生传下的古老习惯统治的社会；既然还不存在书写，后来的继承者就不能直接地与原初的立法者相联系；他们无法知道他们的父辈或祖父辈是否偏离了原初立法者的意图，是否用仅仅人为的附加或减少去毁损那些神圣的消息；因此一个未开化的社会不能前后一贯地按其"最好即最古老"的原则去行为。只有立法者留下的书写才使他们向后代直接说话成为可能。因此，企图回到未开化状态是自相矛盾的。我们被迫与书一起生活。但生命太短暂了，以致于我们只能（选择）和那些最伟大的书活在一起。在此，正如在其他方面一样，我们最好从这些最伟大的心灵中选取一位作为我们的榜样，他因其共通感[７]（common sense）而成为我们和这些最伟大的心灵之间的那个中介。苏格位底从不写书，但他读书。让我引证苏格拉底的一段论述吧，它几乎 谈到了与我们的主题相关的所有应被提及的事情，带着一种属于古代的高贵的单纯和宁静的卓越?;就像别人爱马、爱狗或爱鸟那样，我自己甚至更喜欢一位好的朋友……古老的贤人们通过把他们自身写进书中而留下的财富，我与我的朋友们一起展开它并穿行其上，而且如果我们看到了什么好东西，我们就拾起它并把它当做一次丰盛的收获，倘若我们因此能有益于他人的话。"传言这段话的人评论到："当我听到这些时，对我来说不仅苏格拉底受到祝佑，而且他还将那些倾听他谈话的人引向了完美的贵族气质。"但这个传言是有缺陷的，因为它没有告诉我们任何有关的事情，比如苏格拉底怎么对待古贤人们书中的那些他无法判断其优劣的章节。从另一则传言中，我们知道欧里庇得斯有一次将赫拉克利特的著作送给苏格拉底，并问他对这本著作的意见。苏格拉底说?我已经理解的部分是卓越而高贵的；我相信我所不能理解的部分同样是真实的；但为了理解这本著作，一个人肯定需要成为某种专门的潜海采珠者[８]。"
作为对完美的贵族气质和对人的优异的教育，自由教育由唤醒一个人自身的优异与卓越构成。而自由教育通过何种道路和方式唤醒我们身上的卓越？在此我们无法再更进一步地思考自由教育的含义了。我们听过柏拉图关于最高意义上的教育是哲学的提法。哲学是对智慧或对关于最重要的、最高的或最整全的事物的知识的追求；这种知识，按他的说法，是德性和幸福。但由于智慧不属于人，因此人的德性和幸福总是不完善的。尽管如此，哲学家，作为不完全智慧的人，还是被宣称为唯一真正的国王；他被宣称为拥有所有人类心灵能够达到的优异，因而是最高水平上的人。从这里我们必须得出我们不是哲学家的结论--因为我们无法获得这种最高形式的教育。我们一定不能被自己经常遇到一些自称哲学家的人所欺骗。因为他们采用的是一个对管理的方便来说有必要的广义的表述。他们通常不过是说他们是哲学系的。而认为哲学系的就是哲学家，和认为艺术系的就是艺术家一样荒谬。我们不能成为哲学家，但我们可以热爱哲学；我们可以努力进行哲学化的思考。这种哲学化的思考首先和主要的途径，就是倾听伟大哲学家之间，或者，更普遍和更审慎地说，最伟大心灵之间的交谈，并因而就是研读那些伟大的著作。我们应当倾听的最伟大的心灵并不只是西方的。妨碍我们倾听印度和中国的伟大心灵的仅仅是一种不幸的被迫：我们不懂他们的语言，而且我们不可能学习所有的语言。
再重复一遍：自由教育由倾听最伟大心灵之间的交谈构成。但这里我们面临着一个不可克服的困难：没有我们的帮助这种交谈就不会发生--我们必须实现这一交谈。最伟大的心灵在独白。 我们必须把他们的独白转换为一次对话，使他们"肩并肩"地进入这一"聚会"。甚至在写作对话录时，最伟大的心灵也仍在独白。如果我们看一看柏拉图的对话，就会发现没有一篇对话是发生在最高水平的心灵之间的：所有的柏拉图对话都是在一个较高的人和一个较低者之间进行。柏拉图显然认为一个人无法写出一篇在两个最高水平的人之间进行的对话。我们因而必须去做某些连最伟大的心灵都不能做到的事情。让我们直面这一困难--它是如此巨大以致于自由教育看来是荒谬的。既然最伟大的心灵们在最重要的事情上彼此之间相互矛盾，他们就迫使我们在他们的独白中做出裁决；我们不可能对他们所说的任何东西都表示相信。另一方面，我们不能不注意到，我们并不胜任做这种裁决者。
事情的真相被一种轻便的幻觉与我们隔开来。我们不知何故竟相信我们的观点比那些最伟大的心灵的观点更高、更优越——这既是因为我们的观点是我们时代的，而我们的时代，作为最伟大心灵所属时代的后来者，能被设想为优越于他们的时代；此外还因为我们相信他们中的每一位就其角度而言是正确的，但不是像他所声称的那样是完全的真理：我们知道不存在完全真实的实质性观点，而只存在一个完全真实的形式性观点；这个形式性观点是一种洞察，即任何整全性观点都是相对于特定视角而言的，因此所有的整全性观点都是独断并因而没有一个是完全真实的[９]。向我们隐藏我们真实处境的轻便幻觉都导因于此：我们是，或能是比过去时代的最智慧者更聪明的。我们因此导向这样的角色，不是成为专注和温驯的听者，而是成为指挥或驯狮员。但我们仍必须面对让我们敬畏的境况，它由一种努力带来，在其中我们不仅是专注和温驯的听者，而且是裁决者，并且我们仍然不能胜任这一角色。对我来说，这种境况的原因在于我们失去了所有我们能够信任的完全权威的传统，丧失了给我们以权威性引导的习俗（nomos），因为我们的老师以及老师的老师相信一个完全理性的社会的可能性。我们这里的每一位都被迫用他自己的力量寻找方向，然而这些方向都是有缺陷的。
除了其固有之物外，我们不能从这一活动中获得其他的安慰。哲学，我们已经知道，必须谨防希望给人以启迪--它只能是一种内在的启迪。我们只有经常理解一点有意义的东西才能发挥我们的理解力，而这一理解活动可以伴以对理解的领会，对理解的理解，对意向的意向（noesis noeseos），并且它是如此优越、如此纯粹、如此高贵的一种经验，以致于亚里士多德把它归之于神。这种经验完全独立于我们主要的理解是令人愉快还是令人不快，是美丽还是丑陋。它使我们认识到，要想理解，我们必须承认所有的邪恶在某种意义上都是必然的。它使我们能以上帝之城的好公民的精神接受发生于我们身上的邪恶，而且很可能是使我们伤心的邪恶。在意识到心灵的尊严的同时，我们也意识到人的尊严的基础以及世界的善。不管我们认为这个世界是被创造出来的还是自然的，它都是人类的家园，因为它是人类精神的发源地。
自由教育，作为与最伟大心灵们的不断交流，是一种在温顺（modesty）而不只是谦卑 (humility)的最高形式之中的试验。它同时是一次勇敢的冒险：它要求我们完全冲破智识者的浮华世界，它和他们的敌人的世界完全相同，冲破它的喧嚣、它的浮躁、它的无思考和它的廉价。它要求我们勇敢，并意味着决心将所接受的观点都仅仅当成意见，或者把普通意见当成至少与最陌生和最不流行的意见一样可能出错的极端意见。自由教育是从庸俗中的解放。希腊人对庸俗有一个绝妙的词；他们称之为apeirokalia，形容其缺乏对美好事物的经历。而自由教育将赠予我们这样的经历，在美好之中。
说说我的看法高级模式
Robert Maynard Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor
Department of Political Science
The University of ChicagoAn Address Delivered
at the Tenth Annual Graduation Exercises
of the
Basic Program of Liberal Education for Adults
June 6, 1959
Leo Strauss was born in Germany in 1899. Since coming to the United States in 1938 he has been professor of political science and philosophy at the New School for Social Research and professor of political science at the University of Chicago. In 1954-55 he was visiting professor of philosophy and political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Among the books Professor Strauss has written are The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, Natural Right and History, and Thoughts on Machiavelli.
You have acquired a liberal education. I congratulate you on your achievement. If I were entitled to do so, I would praise you for your achievement. But I would be untrue to the obligation which I have undertaken if I did not supplement my congratulations with a warning. The liberal education which you have acquired will avert the danger that the warning will be understood as a counsel of despair. Liberal education is education in culture or toward culture. The finished product of a liberal education is a cultured human being. "Culture" (cultura) means primarily agriculture: the cultivation of the soil and its products, taking care of the soil, improving the soil in accordance with its nature. "Culture" means derivatively and today chiefly the cultivation of the mind, the taking care and improving of the native faculties of the mind in accordance with the nature of the mind. Just as the soil needs cultivators of the soil, the mind needs teachers. But teachers are not as easy to come by as farmers. The teachers themselves are pupils and must be pupils. But there cannot be an infinite regress: ultimately there must be teachers who are not in turn pupils. Those teachers who are not in turn pupils are the great minds or, in order to avoid any ambiguity in a matter of such importance, the greatest minds. Such men are extremely rare. We are not likely to meet any of them in any classroom. We are not likely to meet any of them anywhere. It is a piece of good luck if there is a single one alive in one's time. For all practical purposes, pupils, of whatever degree of proficiency, have access to the teachers who are not in turn pupils, to the greatest minds, only through the great books. Liberal education will then consist in studying with the proper care the great books which the greatest minds have left behind -- a study in which the more experienced pupils assist the less experienced pupils, including the beginners. This is not an easy task, as would appear if we were to consider the formula which I have just mentioned. That formula requires a long commentary. Many lives have been spent and may still be spent in writing such commentaries. For instance, what is meant by the remark that the great books should be studied "with the proper care"? At present I mention only one difficulty which is obvious to everyone among you: the greatest minds do not all tell us the same things regarding the most important themes; the community of the greatest minds is rent by discord and even by various kinds of discord. Whatever further consequences this may entail, it certainly entails the consequence that liberal education cannot be simply indoctrination. I mention yet another difficulty. "Liberal education is education in culture." In what culture? Our answer is: culture in the sense of the Western tradition. Yet Western culture is only one among many cultures. By limiting ourselves to Western culture, do we not condemn liberal education to a kind of parochialism, and is not parochialism incompatible with the liberalism, the generosity, the open-mindedness, of liberal education? Our notion of liberal education does not seem to fit an age which is aware of the fact that there is not the culture of the human mind but a variety of cultures. Obviously, "culture" if susceptible of being used in the plural is not quite the same thing as "culture" which is a singulare tantum, which can be used only in the singular. "Culture" is now no longer, as people say, an absolute but has become relative. It is not easy to say what culture susceptible of being used in the plural means. As a consequence of this obscurity people have suggested, explicitly or implicitly, that "culture" is any pattern of conduct common to any human group. Hence we do not hesitate to speak of the culture of suburbia or of the cultures of juvenile gangs both non-delinquent and delinquent. In other words, every human being outside of lunatic asylums is a cultured human being, for he participates in a culture. At the frontiers of research there arises the question as to whether there are not cultures also of inmates of lunatic asylums. If we contrast the present day usage of "culture" with the original meaning, it is as if someone would say that the cultivation of a garden may consist of the garden being littered with empty tin cans and whiskey bottles and used papers of various descriptions thrown around the garden at random. Having arrived at this point, we realize that we have lost our way somehow. Let us then make a fresh start by raising the question: what can liberal education mean here and now? Liberal education is literate education of a certain kind: some sort of education in letters or through letters. There is no need to make a case for literacy; every voter knows that modern democracy stands or falls by literacy. In order to understand this need we must reflect on modern democracy. What is modern democracy? It was once said that democracy is the regime that stands or falls by virtue: a democracy is a regime in which all or most adults are men of virtue, and since virtue seems to require wisdom, a regime in which all or most adults are virtuous and wise, or the society in which all or most adults have developed their reason to a high degree, or the rational society. Democracy in a word is meant to be an aristocracy which has broadened into a universal aristocracy. Prior to the emergence of modern democracy some doubts were felt whether democracy thus understood is possible. As one of the two greatest minds among the theorists of democracy put it, "If there were a people consisting of gods, it would rule itself democratically. A government of such perfection is not suitable for human beings." This still and small voice has by now become a high-powered loudspeaker. There exists a whole science -- the science which I among thousands profess to teach, political science -- which so to speak has no other theme than the contrast between the original conception of democracy, or what one may call the ideal of democracy, and democracy as it is. According to an extreme view which is the predominant view in the profession, the ideal of democracy was a sheer delusion and the only thing which matters is the behavior of democracies and the behavior of men in democracies. Modem democracy, so far from being universal aristocracy, would be mass rule were it not for the fact that the mass cannot rule but is ruled by elites, i.e., groupings of men who for whatever reason are on top or have a fair chance to arrive at the top; one of the most important virtues required for the smooth working of democracy, as far as the mass is concerned, is said to be electoral apathy, i.e., lack of public spirit; not indeed the salt of the earth but the salt of modern democracy are those citizens who read nothing except the sports page and the comic section. Democracy is then not indeed mass rule but mass culture. A mass culture is a culture which can be appropriated by the meanest capacities without any intellectual and moral effort whatsoever and at a very low monetary price. But even a mass culture and precisely a mass culture requires a constant supply of what are called new ideas, which are the products of what are called creative minds: even singing commercials lose their appeal if they are not varied from time to time. But democracy, even if it is only regarded as the hard shell which protects the soft mass culture, requires in the long run qualities of an entirely different kind: qualities of dedication, of concentration, of breadth and of depth. Thus we understand most easily what liberal education means here and now. Liberal education is the counter-poison to mass culture, to the corroding effects of mass culture, to its inherent tendency to produce nothing but "specialists without spirit or vision and voluptuaries without heart." Liberal education is the ladder by which we try to ascend from mass democracy to democracy as originally meant. Liberal education is the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within democratic mass society. Liberal education reminds those members of a mass democracy who have ears to hear, of human greatness. Someone might say that this notion of liberal education is merely political, that it dogmatically assumes the goodness of modem democracy. Can we not turn our backs on modem society? Can we not return to nature, to the life of preliterate tribes? Are we not crushed, nauseated, degraded by the mass of printed material, the graveyards of so many beautiful and majestic forests? It is not sufficient to say that this is mere romanticism, that we today cannot return to nature: may not coming generations, after a man-wrought cataclysm, be compelled to live in illiterate tribes? Will our thoughts concerning thermonuclear wars not be affected by such prospects? Certain it is that the horrors of mass culture (which include guided tours to integer nature) render intelligible the longing for a return to nature. An illiterate society at its best is a society ruled by age-old ancestral custom which it traces to original founders, gods or sons of gods or pupils of gods; since there are no letters in such a society, the late heirs cannot be in direct contact with the original founders; they cannot know whether the fathers or grandfathers have not deviated from what the original founders meant, or have not defaced the divine message by merely human additions or subtractions; hence an illiterate society cannot consistently act on its principle that the best is the oldest. Only letters which have come down from the founders can make it possible for the founders to speak directly to the latest heirs. It is then self-contradictory to wish to return to illiteracy. We are compelled to live with books. But life is too short to live with any but the greatest books. In this respect as well as in some others, we do well to take as our model that one among the greatest minds who because of his common sense is the mediator between us and the greatest minds. Socrates never wrote a book but be read books. Let me quote a statement of Socrates which says almost everything that has to be said on our subject, with the noble simplicity and quiet greatness of the ancients. "Just as others are pleased by a good horse or dog or bird, I myself am pleased to an even higher degree by good friends. . . . And the treasures of the wise men of old which they left behind by writing them in books, I unfold and go through them together with my friends, and if we see something good, we pick it out and regard it as a great gain if we thus become useful to one another." The man who reports this utterance, adds the remark: "When I heard this, it seemed to me both that Socrates was blessed and that be was leading those listening to him toward perfect gentlemanship." This report is defective since it does not tell us anything as to what Socrates did regarding those passages in the books of the wise men of old of which he did not know whether they were good. From another report we learn that Euripides once gave Socrates the writing of Heraclitus and then asked him for his opinion about that writing. Socrates said: "What I have understood is great and noble; I believe this is also true of what I have not understood; but one surely needs for understanding that writing some special sort of a diver." Education to perfect gentlemanship, to human excellence, liberal education consists in reminding oneself of human excellence, of human greatness. In what way, by what means does liberal education remind us of human greatness? We cannot think highly enough of what liberal education is meant to be. We have beard Plato's suggestion that education in the highest sense is philosophy. Philosophy is quest for wisdom or quest for knowledge regarding the most important, the highest, or the most comprehensive things; such knowledge, he suggested, is virtue and is happiness. But wisdom is inaccessible to man and hence virtue and happiness will always be imperfect. In spite of this, the philosopher, who, as such, is not simply wise, is declared to be the only true king; be is declared to possess all the excellences of which man's mind is capable, to the highest degree. From this we must draw the conclusion that we cannot be philosophers -- that we cannot acquire the highest form of education. We must not be deceived by the fact that we meet many people who say that they are philosophers. For those people employ a loose expression which is perhaps necessitated by administrative convenience. Often they mean merely that they are members of philosophy departments. And it is as absurd to expect members of philosophy departments to be philosophers as it is to expect members of art departments to be artists. We cannot be philosophers but we can love philosophy; we can try to philosophize. This philosophizing consists at any rate primarily and in a way chiefly in listening to the conversation between the great philosophers or, more generally and more cautiously, between the greatest minds, and therefore in studying the great books. The greatest minds to whom we ought to listen are by no means exclusively the greatest minds of the West. It is merely an unfortunate necessity which prevents us from listening to the greatest minds of India and of China: we do not understand their languages, and we cannot learn all languages. To repeat, liberal education consists in listening to the conversation among the greatest minds. But here we are confronted with the overwhelming difficulty that this conversation does not take place without our help -- that in fact we must bring about that conversation. The greatest minds utter monologues. We must transform their monologues into a dialogue, their "side by side" into a "together." The greatest minds utter monologues even when they write dialogues. When we look at the Platonic dialogues, we observe that there is never a dialogue among minds of the highest order: all Platonic dialogues are dialogues between a superior man and men inferior to him. Plato apparently felt that one could not write a dialogue between two men of the highest order. We must then do something which the greatest minds were unable to do. Let us face this difficulty -- a difficulty so great that it seems to condemn liberal education as an absurdity. Since the greatest minds contradict one another regarding the most important matters, they compel us to judge of their monologues; we cannot take on trust what any one of them says. On the other hand we cannot but notice that we are not competent to be judges. This state of things is concealed from us by a number of facile delusions. We somehow believe that our point of view is superior, higher than those of the greatest minds -- either because our point of view is that of our time, and our time, being later than the time of the greatest minds, can be presumed to be superior to their times; or else because we believe that each of the greatest minds was right from his point of view but not, as be claims, simply right: we know that there cannot be the simply true substantive view but only a simply true formal view; that formal view consists in the insight that every comprehensive view is relative to a specific perspective, or that all comprehensive views are mutually exclusive and none can be simply true. The facile delusions which conceal from us our true situation all amount to this, that we are, or can be, wiser than the wisest men of the past. We are thus induced to play the part not of attentive and docile listeners but of impresarios or lion-tamers. Yet we must face our awesome situation, created by the necessity that we try to be more than attentive and docile listeners, namely, judges, and yet we are not competent to be judges. As it seems to me, the cause of this situation is that we have lost all simply authoritative traditions in which we could trust, the nomos which gave us authoritative guidance, because our immediate teachers and teachers' teachers believed in the possibility of a simply rational society. Each of us here is compelled to find his bearings by his own powers however defective they may be. We have no comfort other than that inherent in this activity. Philosophy, we have learned, must be on its guard against the wish to be edifying -- philosophy can only be intrinsically edifying. We cannot exert our understanding without from time to time understanding something of importance; and this act of understanding may be accompanied by the awareness of our understanding, by the understanding of understanding, by noesis noeseos, and this is so high, so pure, so noble an experience that Aristotle could ascribe it to his God. This experience is entirely independent of whether what we understand primarily is pleasing or displeasing, fair or ugly. It leads us to realize that all evils are in a sense necessary if there is to be understanding. It enables us to accept all evils which befall us and which may well break our hearts in the spirit of good citizens of the city of God. By becoming aware of the dignity of the mind, we realize the true ground of the dignity of man and therewith the goodness of the world, whether we understand it as created or as uncreated, which is the home of man because it is the home of the human mind. Liberal education, which consists in the constant intercourse with the greatest minds, is a training in the highest form of modesty, not to say of humility. It is at the same time a training in boldness: it demands from us the complete break with the noise, the rush, the thoughtlessness, the cheapness of the Vanity Fair of the intellectuals as well as of their enemies. It demands from us the boldness implied in the resolve to regard the accepted views as mere opinions, or to regard the average opinions as extreme opinions which are at least as likely to be wrong as the most strange or the least popular opinions. Liberal education is liberation from vulgarity. The Greeks had a beautiful word for "vulgarity"; they called it apeirokalia, lack of experience in things beautiful. Liberal education supplies us with experience in things beautiful.